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Pragmatism, Law, and Morality
The Lessons of Buck v. Bell
Susan Haack
AUTHOR'S NOTE
My thanks to Maribel Narvaez, for comments on an earlier paper of mine that suggested
the topic for the present paper; to Mark Migotti, for helpful comments on a draft; and to
Pamela Lucken, for skilled help in finding relevant materials.
To say that man is made up of strength and
weakness, pettiness and grandeur, is not to draw




1 Not long ago,2 I  was  startled to read in my morning paper that  legislators  in North
Carolina were nearing consensus on how to compensate roughly 3,000 people who had
been involuntarily sterilized under the state’s eugenics laws3 – the first of which was
enacted in 1919,4 and the most recent of which wasn’t repealed until 2003.5 Until then, I
had no idea such laws had survived so long; now I know that the Mississippi sterilization
statute wasn’t repealed until 20086 – and that a 1909 Washington sterilization statute
remains on the books to this day.7
2 Inevitably,  my thoughts turned to Justice Holmes’s  now-notorious ruling for the U.S.
Supreme  Court  in  the  1927  case  of  Buck  v.  Bell,  holding  that  an  order  from  the
superintendent of the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and the Feeble Minded that
inmate Carrie Buck be sterilized didn’t violate her constitutional rights;8 and I began to
wonder whether, and if so how, exactly, this ruling should bear on our assessment of
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s theoretical ideas about the law, and especially of his ideas about
the relation of law and morality.
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3 Traditionally regarded as the first legal pragmatist, Holmes has variously been accused of
inconsistency on the subject of law and morality,9 of moral skepticism, 10 and even of
“brutalitarianism”:11 which some might think his ruling in Buck v. Bell confirms. But this, I
will argue, is a mistake: Holmes, like James and Dewey, held a kind of moral fallibilism –
which is far removed from moral skepticism, and conduces neither to inconsistency nor
to  brutalitarianism;  and  his  ruling  in  Buck  v.  Bell,  morally  misguided  as  it  is,  is
nevertheless  illustrative  of  Holmes’s  larger  theoretical  point,  that  judges  are  no less
fallible about moral questions than the rest of us, and it’s dangerous for them to imagine
otherwise.
4 I begin, in §1, by tracing pragmatist themes in Holmes’s legal thinking; and then, in §2,
look more closely at what he has to say specifically about the relation of law and morality.
The next step, in §3, will be to explore the ruling in Buck v. Bell, the history of the case, its
context,  and  its  consequences;  and  finally,  in  §4,  I  conclude  by  spelling  out  some
philosophical lessons to be learned from this disturbing, but fascinating, story.
 
I. Holmes and his Place in Pragmatism
5 “Mr. Justice Holmes,” Peirce wrote around 1906, “will not, I believe, take it ill that we are
proud to remember his membership” in the Metaphysical Club.12 In fact, we know that
Holmes was involved even before the first meeting of the club, when James wrote to him
in 1868 from Berlin: “When I get home let’s establish a philosophical society to have
regular meetings and discuss none but the very tallest and broadest questions – to be
composed of none but the very topmost of Boston manhood.”13
6 The son of a well-known physician and poet,14 Holmes was certainly among the very
topmost of young Boston manhood; and by 1868 he had already taken the first steps on
the path that would eventually lead him first to the Massachusetts15 and then to the U.S.
Supreme Court:16 after graduating from Harvard College in 1861 and serving in the Union
army for three years during the Civil War,17 in 1866 he completed his course at Harvard
Law School.18 But “before turning his mind to the more serious business of the law,”
Holmes had “sowed his wild metaphysical oats,” reading especially the empiricists and
the  positivists,19 and  had  attended  some  of  Peirce’s  1866  lectures  on  “The  Logic  of
Science.”20
7 Still, as the saying goes, the law is a jealous mistress; and after the winter of 1871-72
Homes rarely attended meetings of the Metaphysical Club.21 Nor did he ever officially ally
himself with pragmatism – not surprisingly, since both his celebrated book, The Common
Law (1881),22 and his celebrated lecture, “The Path of the Law” (1897) were published
before the public debut of the word “pragmatism,” in its new, philosophical sense (in
James’s 1898 lecture,  “Philosophical  Conceptions and Practical  Results”).23 Indeed,  the
evidence seems to be that Holmes didn’t clearly distinguish James’s pragmatism from his
doctrine of the Will to Believe – which, moreover, he dismissed as an “amusing humbug.”
24 And when, many years later, Holmes read Morris Cohen’s early anthology of Peirce’s
work,25 what seems to have struck him most forcibly was what he took to be Peirce’s
curious weakness for wishful thinking “in the direction of religion &c., […] despite his
devotion to logic.”26
8 Nevertheless, both legal scholars and historians of philosophy acknowledge Holmes as the
first  legal  pragmatist;27 and  with  good  reason,  for  many  themes  familiar  from  the
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philosophers of the classical pragmatist tradition can also be found in Holmes’s legal
thinking.
9 Here, I can only sketch some of the most important:28
10 (i) Law as prediction. Very early on, in 1872, Holmes had written that:
in a civilized state it is not the will of the sovereign that makes lawyers’ law, even
when that is its source, but what […] the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his
will […].”29
11 In 1897, in the first lines of “The Path of the Law,” he returns to this theme. The object of
legal study, he writes, “is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force
through the instrumentality of the courts”; and in the next paragraph he adds:
[…] a legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits
certain things he will  be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the
court; – and so of a legal right.30
12 Holmes’s main point here is that what an attorney advising his client needs to know31
isn’t the “will of the sovereign,”32 or the provisions as written in the statute books; it is,
rather, how those statutes will be interpreted and enforced by the courts. But there is
also, as Fisch points out,33 a clear affinity with Peirce’s statement of the pragmatic maxim:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the
whole of our conception of the object.34
13 And there is, in anything, an even closer affinity with James’s version:
The effective meaning of  any proposition can always be brought down to some
particular  consequence  in  our  future  practical  experience.  […]  There  can be  no
difference  that  doesn’t  make  a  difference  –  no  difference  in  abstract  truth  that
doesn’t make a difference in concrete fact.35
14 In  short,  Holmes  shares  the  (other)  pragmatists’  concern  to  get  away  from  mere
verbalism, and to clarify meanings by reference to consequences.36
15 (ii) The growth and adaptation of legal concepts. In the opening paragraph of The Common Law,
immediately after that memorable line, “the life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience,” Holmes writes that judges’ interpretation of the law has more to do with
“the felt necessities of the time, the relevant moral and political theories, [and] even the
prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men” than with the pristinely logical
implications  of  statutory  provisions.37 Later  in  the  book  he  suggests  why,  when  he
describes how legal concepts shift and change over time: e.g., how older understandings
that held animals and even inanimate objects legally responsible for causing injury or
death gradually gave way to more modern understandings requiring intent or culpable
negligence on the part of a human agent.38
16 Holmes sees such conceptual elasticity as both inevitable and desirable, enabling the law
to adapt to new knowledge, to technological developments, and to changing social mores
and values.39 But this elasticity in legal concepts also means that a legal system can’t
plausibly be conceived axiomatically, as a system of basic legal-conceptual truths from
which correct decisions can simply be deduced – the model proposed by Christopher
Columbus  Langdell,  first  Dean  of  Harvard  Law School  (whom Holmes  once  paid  the
marvelously back-handed compliment, “greatest living legal theologian”!).40
17 Holmes’s ideas about the evolution of legal concepts are strikingly reminiscent of Peirce’s
on the growth of meaning generally – the earliest expression of which comes from the
1866 lectures:
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Science  is  continually  gaining  new  conceptions.  […]  How  much  more  the  word
electricity means now than it meant in the days of Franklin, […] how much more the
term planet means now than it did in the time [of] Hipparchus. These words have
acquired information […].  In fact,  […] men and words reciprocally  educate each
other […].41
18 Returning to this theme two decades later, Peirce uses examples not from the sciences,
but from the concepts of social life:
Symbols grow. […] [A] symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and
in experience, its meaning grows. […] Such words as force, law, wealth, marriage, bear
for us a very different meaning than they bore to our barbarous ancestors.42
19 So  Holmes  shares  not  only  Peirce’s  idea  that  meaning  grows,  but  also  Peirce’s
appreciation  of  the  fact  that  the  enrichment  of  our  vocabulary,  far  from  being  an
impediment to rationality, can actually enhance the cognitive flexibility and adaptability
to changing circumstances that true rationality demands.43
20 (iii) The evolution of legal systems. In his dissenting opinion in Southern Pacific v. Jensen
(1917), Holmes writes that:
The common law is not some brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate
voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified […], the law of
some state.44
21 He had long been impatient with the idea of Law-as-such, thinking rather (in the small) in
terms of the specific legal system of a place and a time and (in the large) of the whole
congeries of legal systems, past, present, and future. And he had long stressed that every
legal system is an artifact of history; all have evolved, grown, adapted – and many have
died away – in response to changing circumstances. The common law, he writes in “The
Path of the Law,” has evolved “like a plant,” growing, spreading, sporting, adapting to
new niches:
The development of [the common] law has gone on for nearly a thousand years, […]
each generation taking the inevitable next step, mind, like matter, simply obeying a
law of spontaneous growth.45
22 So we find in Holmes’s legal thinking the same evolutionary tendencies that, in various
ways, also inform his fellow-pragmatists’ thinking about inquiry, language46 and even, in
Peirce, about the cosmos as a whole. In fact, for a scholar of pragmatism the thought that
Holmes expresses here, and even the language he uses, will bring Peirce’s agapism – his
grand cosmological vision of a universe gradually evolving from chaos to greater order by
“affectability”47 – irresistibly to mind.
23 (vi) Gradualism. “Most differences,” Holmes writes in his ruling in Rideout v. Knox (1889),
turn out, “when nicely analyzed,” to be matters of degree.48 Of necessity, the law draws
sharp lines: e.g., to define the age at which a person is no longer a juvenile but legally an
adult, or the level of blood alcohol that constitutes intoxication for legal purposes; but
such sharp legal  lines  are virtually  always artificial.  It  hardly needs saying that  this
understanding of  legal  dichotomies as  artificial  dualisms imposed on what are really
differences of degree parallels Dewey’s critique of untenable dualisms,49 James’s hope that
pragmatism could bridge the gap between the tough- and the tender-minded50 and, of
course, Peirce’s complaints about those who, flouting the synechistic principle of looking
for continuities rather than hard-and-fast distinctions, “do philosophy with an axe” –
only to end up with “unrelated chunks of being.”51
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24 (v) The past and the future of the law. We can understand why our legal system is as it is
today, Holmes argues, only by looking to its history and to the circumstances in which
this or that law or rule arose. “The law embodies the story of a nation’s development
through many centuries,” he writes in The Common Law, and fully to understand it we
“must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation.”52 In “The Path of
the Law” he returns to this theme, writing that the only way we can understand, for
example, the doctrine in English law that any physical change to a written contract voids
it is to remember that originally a contract was inseparable from the actual physical
parchment  on  which  it  was  written,  and  couldn’t  survive  the  destruction  of  the
parchment or its seal.53 But, Holmes continues, we need a better reason for continuing to
do things a certain way than that this is what we have always done – especially when the
reasons for doing things that way have long since vanished. We should consider, instead:
[…] the ends which [legal] rules seek to accomplish, why those ends are desired,
what is given up to gain them, and whether those ends are worth the price.54
25 In short, Holmes’s insistence that to master the law we must look to the future as well as
the past conforms to the familiar pragmatist pattern of looking to consequences,  the
future, the potential.55
26 (vi) The relevance of the sciences, especially the social sciences, to the law. In the same passage
of “The Path of the Law” in which he writes of the need to consider ends and means, costs
and consequences, Holmes famously observes that “[f]or the rational study of the law the
blackletter man may be the man of the present,” but “the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics.”56 But while Holmes speaks here specifically of
statistics and economics, it’s very clear he has in mind the sciences, especially the social
sciences, generally; and the illustration he gives has to do, not with economics, but with
criminal psychology:
What better have we than a blind guess to show that the criminal law does more
good  than  harm?  […]  Does  punishment  deter?  […]  If  the  typical  criminal  is  a
degenerate, bound to swindle or to murder by as deep-seated an organic necessity
as that which makes the rattlesnake bite, […] he must be got rid of. […] If, on the
other hand, crime, like normal human conduct,  is  mainly a matter of imitation,
punishment may fairly be expected to keep it out of fashion.57
27 One might wish, as I do, that Holmes hadn’t written as if all criminals fall either in the
“rattlesnake” category or  in the “emulating a bad role model” category – his official
gradualism notwithstanding, he seems to have succumbed here to not one but two false
dichotomies! But for now I will only point out the clear affinities of Holmes’s appeal to
criminal  psychology  with  the  (other)  pragmatist  philosophers’  aspiration  to  see
philosophy work hand in hand with the sciences,58 and perhaps especially with Dewey’s
observations about the relevance of the social sciences, including economics, to ethics.59
28 (vii) Moral fallibilism. This leads me to the last on my list of pragmatist themes to be found
in Holmes’s  writing,  and the  one that  will  be  most  important  to  the  argument  that
follows:  the  moral  fallibilism  that  informs  his  resistance  to  those  “who  think  it
advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.”60 This is close kin, not only
to the fallibilism of  James’s  and Dewey’s  moral  philosophies specifically,61 but  to the
fallibilist spirit of the pragmatist movement more generally.62 On this subject, however,
Holmes has often been misunderstood; and so, especially in view of its importance to the
present argument, it deserves its own section.
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II. Law, Morality, and Public Sentiment
29 “If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man”:63 from
the perspective, that is, of a person who cares only about the advantages or disadvantages
to himself of doing this or that, and is entirely indifferent to what may be morally right or
morally wrong. This is Holmes’s heuristic device for avoiding the confusions of law and
morality that he believed were ubiquitous:
Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law? You will find some text
writers telling you that it  is  […] a system of reason, that it  is  a deduction from
principles of ethics or admitted axioms or what not […]. But if we take the view of
our friend the bad man we shall  find that  he does not  care two straws for the
axioms or deductions, but he does care what the Massachusetts or English courts
are likely to do in fact. I am much of his mind.64
30 His point is that, despite a substantial overlap of their vocabularies (“right,” “obligation,”
“duty,”  “responsibility,”  etc.),  law and  morality  are  conceptually  distinct.  Moreover,
Holmes continues, even where the law shares a vocabulary with ethics, the words have
different meanings in the different contexts; and if we forget this we will inevitably fall
into fallacies of equivocation. “[N]othing but confusion of thought,” as he puts it, “can
result from assuming that the rights of man in a moral sense are equally rights in the
sense of the Constitution and the law.”65
31 Law and morality, Holmes continues, are also different in extension. Some moral rights,
obligations, etc., fall outside the scope of the law; and some legal provisions fall outside
the scope of morality. As Holmes puts it, “[f]or the most part [the law] falls well within
the lines of any [moral] system, and in some cases may extend beyond them.”66 At the
same time, however, he makes no bones about the fact that “[morally] wrong statutes can
be and have been enforced.”67
32 But though he emphasizes the differences (both in intension and in extension) between
law and morality, Holmes doesn’t deny the moral relevance of law. Far from it. “I take for
granted that no reader of mine will mistake what I say for the language of cynicism,” he
writes;68 and roundly declares that the law:
[…] is the witness and external development of our moral life.  Its history is the
history of the moral development of the race. The practice of it, despite popular
jests, tends to make good citizens and good men.69
33 Two points combine here: first, that a legal system reflects the moral sensibilities and
moral fault lines of its place and its time, and changes as those sensibilities change; and
second,  that  the  rule  of  law  itself  brings  moral  benefits.  With  respect  to  the  first,
evidently at least part of what Holmes has in mind is that judges’ interpretations of the
law are influenced by their moral attitudes, and that these moral attitudes are usually
also those of the community at large – or, often, reflect significant moral disagreements
within the community. With respect to the second, it seems he has in mind not only that
the rule of law makes life safer and more predictable, but also that a (decent) legal system
can enable and encourage moral progress.
34 Holmes urges that judges look to considerations of “social advantage”;70 meaning, as I
read him, not that they should advance the interests of this or that social class, but that
they should consider the good of society as a whole. True, he also writes of “legal battle
grounds where […] the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given
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body in a given place and time”;71 but the context makes clear this refers only to cases
where “the means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time.”72 And
in a speech given in 1913 he warns that:
[i]t is a misfortune if a judge reads his conscious or unconscious sympathy with one
side or the other prematurely into the law, and forgets that what seem [to him] to
be first principles are believed by half his fellow-men to be wrong.73
35 This caution against moral over-confidence echoes Peirce’s warnings about “the blight of
cocksureness,”74 the danger of being too sure that you know.
36 In explaining the difference between legal and moral uses of the same language, Holmes
seems to suggest that the law is concerned only with external acts, while morality focuses
on intentions.75 This can’t be right. The law often cares, not only about a person’s overt
actions,  but  also about  his  intent:  indeed,  mens  rea  is  a  key requirement of  criminal
responsibility.76 (No doubt Holmes would greatly have disliked the idea of “hate crime,”
where the law imposes additional penalties on those convicted of certain crimes if their
actions  are  found to  have  been  motivated  by  racial  or  other  forms  of  hatred;77 but
obviously  that  doesn’t  make his  diagnosis  of  the conceptual  difference correct.)  And
sometimes I get the impression that Holmes takes too easily for granted that the “moral
development”  reflected  in  the  evolution  of  a  legal  system  invariably  moves  in  the
direction of moral improvement. This can’t be right either. The history of law e.g., in Nazi
Germany, or in South Africa under apartheid, reveals that, sadly, there absolutely is no
guarantee of this.78
37 Nevertheless, where Holmes’s larger perspective on law, morality, and public sentiment is
concerned, I am, as he might say, “much of his mind”:79
38 - Law and morality are conceptually distinct. That’s right: to say that it’s morally wrong to
overburden your secretary with trivial or inappropriate tasks, or to grade your students’
papers without actually reading them, is one thing; to say that such behavior is, or should
be, legally prohibited is something else entirely.
- Law and morality differ in extension. That’s right: many legal norms (e.g., about which side
of the road to drive on, or how big a tax break you get if you install a more efficient air-
conditioner) are morally indifferent; many morally objectionable forms of behavior (e.g.,
being  hurtful  or  inconsiderate  to  your  spouse,  or  buying “your”  term paper  from a
commercial outfit that supplies such thingsfor a price)80 fall outside the scope of legal
regulation; and some legal norms (such as Nazi race laws,81 “Jim Crow” laws in southern
U.S. states,82 or the Pakistani law that required four male, Muslim eye-witnesses to prove
a charge of rape)83 are morally deplorable.
- The evolution of a legal system is intimately connected to the moral evolution of the community.
That’s right: legislators may change existing laws, or impose new ones, and judges may
interpret old laws differently (e.g., to forbid the execution of underage criminals,84 or
extend  the  right  to  marry  to  same-sex  couples,  etc.)85 as  the  moral  values  of  the
community shift and change.
- The rule of law itself contributes to the moral life of a community. That’s right. The rule of law
– in various degrees, depending on the character of the legal system in question – makes
life safer and provides a degree of predictability that enables more people to flourish. And
a good legal system may actually enlarge the moral vision of a community.
- What is morally right or good isn’t something a that judge (or anyone else) can know a
priori; and a judge’s moral convictions and intuitions (like everyone else’s) are fallible.
That’s right: what moral rules and social arrangements will best enable the most people
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to  flourish  and  get  on  with  the  projects  that  matter  to  them isn’t  transparent;  it’s
something that has to be, gradually and often painfully, worked out.
39 In short: in my estimation, Holmes has a pretty good (though not, to be sure, a perfect)
understanding of  the relation of  law and morality.  But  whether and,  if  so,  how this
assessment can be squared with his ruling in Buck v. Bell is a question that can only be
answered by looking more closely at the case and its context – the subject of the next
section.
 
III. Buck v. Bell and its Background
40 The idea of eugenics is very old. In the 6th century B.C., Theognis had complained that,
while we are careful to breed the best cattle and horses, among humans “everything is
mixed, noble and base,” leading to a “degraded, motley” race of men.86 More famously, in
Book V of  Plato’s  Republic,  drawing an analogy with breeding hunting dogs,  Socrates
proposes that in the ideal city “the best men must have sex with the best women as
frequently as possible, while the opposite is true of the most inferior men and women.”87
But the word “eugenics” wasn’t coined until 1883, when Francis Galton introduced it to
refer to “all influences that tend to however remote a degree to give the more suitable
races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable.”88
41 Galton was second cousin to Charles Darwin, who had observed in The Origin of Species
(1859) that, while the usual mechanism of evolution was natural selection, human beings
have contributed to the process artificially by selectively breeding strains of animal and
plant potentially useful to them:
We cannot suppose that all the breeds [of domesticated animals and plants] were
suddenly produced […] as we now see them; indeed, in several instances we know
this has not been their history. The key is man’s power of accumulative selection.89
42 Nature provides the variations; human beings select those they find desirable, and so, by
artificial selection over many generations, create new breeds of domestic animal or plant.
90
43 In The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin extends his theory to the origin of human beings.
Discussing the effect of civilization on natural selection, he writes that “[among savages]
the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated,” but that in civilized societies we “do our
utmost to check the process of elimination,” so that the weak survive to propagate their
kind; and continues, “[n]o one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will
doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man.” In this context, he cites
Galton.91
44 Gregor Mendel’s work on the genetics of inheritance, published in 1865, had gone largely
unnoticed for decades. But by 1900 other scientists had rediscovered Mendel’s laws;92 and
in the early years of the twentieth century many took for granted that laws like those
Mendel had found to govern the inheritance of the height of pea plants or the color of
their  flowers  could  easily  be  extrapolated  to  complex  human  traits  like  feeble-
mindedness  or  criminal  tendencies.  The  stage  was  set  for  the  rise  of  the  eugenics
movement.
45 In Hereditary Genius (1870), Galton had written that “the wisest policy” is to “retard the
average age of marriage among the weak, and […] hasten it among the vigorous classes.”93
In 1905, he proposed new statistical studies of inherited family traits.94 In his memoirs,
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published  in  1909,  he  advocated  measures  to  prevent  people  seriously  afflicted  by
“lunacy, feeble-mindedness, habitual criminality, and pauperism” from reproducing their
kind.95 The aim of eugenics, he averred, is “to check the birth-rate of the Unfit,” and to
“further[] the productivity of the Fit,” thus “bringing no more individuals into the world
than can be properly cared for, and those of the best stock.”96 And in a fragment of a work
of  fiction,  “The  Eugenic  College  of  Kantsaywhere,”  published  posthumously,  Galton
described a world – by his lights, a utopia – where citizens are examined for physical,
mental, aesthetic and “ancestral” fitness. A grade of “Pass” in Genetic Fitness allows the
candidate to marry and reproduce. A grade of “Honours” privileges him or her to make a
“College marriage” with another such graduate. Those who fail, however, are forbidden
to procreate; and for “the idiots, insane and the Feeble-minded,” genetically the least fit,
reproduction is a crime, to be severely punished.97
46 That was fiction; but it didn’t take long for such ideas to take firm hold in the real world.98
In Britain,  where there was much concern about the “degeneration” of  the race,  Sir
William Beveridge (who would play a key role in the establishment of the welfare system)
thought  that,  while  “unemployables”  should  be  taken  care  of,  they  should  also  be
deprived of all rights of citizenship, including the right to “fatherhood”; and Winston
Churchill  told a delegation from the National  Association for the Care of  the Feeble-
Minded that such people should be segregated “so that their curse die[s] with them.”99 A
eugenicist thread runs through the anti-individualist, “scientific” socialism of Sidney and
Beatrice  Webb,100 and  can  be  seen  in  Karl  Pearson’s  declaration  that  “the  child  is
economically a commodity.”101
47 And in the U.S. too, enthusiasm for eugenics was on the rise.102 The first U.S. eugenics law
was passed in Indiana in 1907103 and by 1924, the year of the Virginia law challenged in
Buck,  similar laws had been passed in Washington, California, and Connecticut (1909),
Nevada, Iowa, and New Jersey (1911), New York (1912), North Dakota, Kansas, Michigan,
and Wisconsin (1913), Oregon, South Dakota, and New Hampshire (1917), North Carolina
and  Alabama  (1919),  and  Montana  and  Delaware  (1923).104 Kansas  had  the  dubious
distinction of enacting the most severe of these laws, going so far as to make it a crime
“for any managing officer of a state institution to fail to recommend the sterilization of
any inmate ‘unfit to procreate’”;105 California – where the law applied to inmates of all
state institutions and anyone convicted three times of any offence and deemed to be a
“sexual or moral pervert,” and after 1919 to the insane as well as the feeble-minded – had
the dubious distinction of performing the largest number of compulsory sterilizations.106
48 Some  eugenic  sterilization  bills,  however,  were  defeated  in  state  legislatures,107 and
others were vetoed by the governor of the state concerned.108 And some eugenics statutes
had already been challenged in the courts. In 1917, for example, a federal judge ruled that
performing a vasectomy on repeat-offender Rudolph Davis under the Iowa statute “for
the Unsexing of Criminals, Idiots, etc.”109 constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and
so  was  unconstitutional.110 Shortly  thereafter,  Iowa  repealed  the  law  Davis  had
challenged.111 The year after that,  a federal court had reversed the sentence, under a
Nevada law, that convicted rapist Pearley Mickle be sterilized.112
49 By this  time,  the  Eugenics  Record  Office  (ERO),  founded in  1910  at  the  initiative  of
biologist Charles Davenport and run by biology teacher Harry Laughlin, had spearheaded
a program of research, publication, and training of field workers in eugenics.113 At the
first national conference on Race Betterment [sic],  held in Michigan in 1914, Laughlin
presented details of the program of sterilization to eliminate the eugenically unfit that he
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had already spelled out in an ERO publication; along with a “Model Sterilization Law”
intended “to prevent the procreation of feebleminded, epileptic, inebriate, criminalistic
and other degenerate persons by authorizing and providing by due process of law for the
sterilization of persons with inferior hereditary properties.”114
50 In 1921, the Chief Judge of the Chicago Municipal Court, Henry Olson, met Laughlin at a
Eugenics Congress in New York, and the next year re-edited and subsidized the reissue of
Laughlin’s book, Eugenical Sterilization.115 The new edition included a final part, written by
Olson, arguing that the Model Law was constitutionally valid. Limiting reproduction for
the  good of  society,  he  argued,  was  no  less  constitutional  than executing  criminals,
conscripting citizens into military service, or requiring compulsory vaccinations.116 The
legally key points, he thought, were that compulsory sterilization be presented, not as
punishment  for  a  crime,  but  as  for  the  good  of  the  “patient”;  and  that  adequate
procedural safeguards be included.
51 The same year, 1922, G. K. Chesterton argued in Eugenics and Other Evils that the “stuffy
science,  […]  bullying  bureaucracy,  […]  [and]  terrorism  by  tenth-rate  professors”
characteristic of eugenics posed a serious threat to individual liberty.117 Two years later,
J. B. S. Haldane observed that “some of the most ferocious enemies of human freedom”
were  advocating  for  eugenics  laws;118 Walter  Fernauld,  president  of  the American
Association for the Study of the Feeble-Minded, criticized the simple hereditarian view of
mental defect;119 and even eugenicist Samuel J. Holmes acknowledged that “[t]here is a
great deal of rubbish written” on the subject,  and that “many of the most important
problems  are  still  very  puzzling.”120 But  by  this  time  the  eugenics  bandwagon  was
unstoppable.
52 The same year, 1924, the state of Virginia passed a law providing that “the health of the
patient  and  welfare  of  the  community  may  be  promoted  in  certain  cases  by  the
sterilization of  mental  defectives,”  and that  a  vasectomy or  salpingectomy121 may be
performed on “any patient [sic] afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, imbecility,
etc.”122 The Virginia law followed Laughlin’s model in being premised on the idea that
compulsory sterilization would be not only for the good of society generally, but also for
the good of the person sterilized – because after the operation he or she could safely be
released  from the  Colony  and  support  him-  or  herself  in  the  outside  world;  and  in
including provisions for notice and a hearing.
53 Under the provisions of this law, the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics
and the Feeble Minded had ordered that Carrie Buck – “a feeble-minded white woman
who was committed to the […] Colony [,] […] the daughter of a feeble-minded woman in
the  same institution,  and the  mother  of  an  illegitimate  feeble-minded child”123 –  be
sterilized. When it became apparent that this would be an important test case, the ERO
sent Arthur H. Estabrook to Virginia to testify for the state, and Laughlin himself supplied
a deposition.124 First the Circuit Court of Amherst County, Virginia, and then the Supreme
Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia, affirmed the order;125 and in 1927 the case came
to the U.S. Supreme Court.
54 Carrie  Buck’s  attorney  argued  that  the  superintendant’s  order  was  unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment; specifically, that “it violates her constitutional right
of bodily integrity and is therefore repugnant to the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”126 By a majority of 8-1,127 however, the Court ruled that Carrie
Buck’s con- stitutional rights had not been violated, and that Virginia could go ahead and
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sterilize her as planned.128 At the request of then-Chief Justice (and former President)
William Howard Taft,129 Holmes wrote the ruling for the majority.
55 Most unusually, the ruling in Buck is only three pages long, and includes only one cita-
tion to an earlier case – a case, moreover, not about compulsory sterilization, but about
compulsory vaccinations. Most of the ruling is taken up with arguments, first, that the
Virginia statute included many safeguards to ensure that “the rights of the patient are
most carefully considered,” and second that, in this instance, “every step was taken in
scrupulous  compliance  to  the  statute.”130 What  the  plaintiff  really  claims,  Holmes
continues,  is  not  that  the statute didn’t  provide for proper procedure,  and not  that,
though proper procedures were provided for, they weren’t followed in this instance, but
that such a law is inherently unconstitutional – that in no circumstances could such an
order be justified. But, Holmes continues, “[w]e have seen more than once that the public
welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives,” and “[i]t would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the state for these lesser
sacrifices […].”131 The Virginia statute falls under the same principle that allows laws
requiring compulsory vaccinations, which the Court had earlier found constitutional.132
Holmes then briskly dismisses the argument that, since it applies only to inmates of the
State Colony, the law violates equal protection: “the law does all that is needed when it
does what it can.”133 And, in the most notorious line of this most notorious ruling, he
declares: “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.”134
56 Perhaps you will notice – what struck me the first time I heard this, and still strikes me
again every time I think about it – that while it is undeniably rhetorically powerful, in a
grim kind of way, it is also maddeningly illogical. The way to avoid a fourth generation of
imbeciles, surely, would have been to sterilize not only Carrie Buck, but also her infant
daughter,  Vivian.  And  perhaps,  when  you  read  Holmes’s  argument  that  the  state
sometimes calls on citizens to make much greater sacrifices than this, you will wonder, as
I do, whether he was remembering the thousands of young men who died in the terrible
civil war in which he had himself fought long before. But none of this really bears on
Holmes’s and his colleagues’ legal reasoning.
57 Probably you will also notice, as I do, that Holmes simply takes the alleged key facts of the
case,  that  all  three  generation  of  Buck  women (Carrie,  her  mother,  Emma,  and  her
daughter, Vivian) were “feeble-minded,” for granted.135 Many years later, Stephen Jay
Gould would conclude that  all  three were mis-diagnosed.136 But  it’s  not  the Supreme
Court’s job to determine questions of fact, but to decide questions of law; so this doesn’t
really help either.
58 Apparently, though, to Holmes and the seven colleagues who voted with him, the case
seemed, legally, an easy one. Only a couple of years before Buck, after all, the Supreme
Court of  Michigan had found an order that a feeble-minded young man be sterilized
constitutional – arguing that biological science has definitely demonstrated that feeble-
mindedness  is  hereditary;  that  the  right  to  beget  children  may  be  outweighed  by
concerns about the common welfare; and that compulsory sterilization is analogous to
compulsory vaccination.137 Holmes and his colleagues, like the majority of the Justices of
the Michigan Supreme Court, took it to be a known scientific fact that feeble-mindedness
was hereditary,  and that eugenics laws were in the interests of society.  Statutes that
imposed  sterilization  as  punishment  for  certain  crimes  had  already  been  ruled
unconstitutional under the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, and eugenics
statutes that didn’t provide adequate procedural safeguards, in the form of appropriate
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notice and a hearing, had already been ruled unconstitutional under the requirement of
due  process  of  law;  but  the  Virginia  statute  was  carefully  crafted  to  avoid  these
constitutional pitfalls. And at this time the standard of review employed by the Supreme
Court in equal-protection cases was simply that there be a “rational basis” for the lower
court’s allowing a statute that applies only to a sub-class of citizens,138 a requirement the
Virginia statute – which applied to inmates of the Colony, who were wards of the state –
also satisfied.
59 To have grasped the potential dangers, and found plausible constitutional grounds for
invalidating the statute, would have required not only much more careful scrutiny of
scientific opinion (where, as we have seen, there was already dissent from some), but also
a serious exercise of epistemic, moral, and legal imagination – though not, I have to add, a
superhuman exercise of the imagination. (In Michigan, after all, the three Justices who
dissented  in  Smith  had  recognized  the  disturbing  weakness  of  the  science  and  the
alarming potential for abuse of compulsory-sterilization laws).139
60 Reactions to the Buck ruling in the press and in medical and other journals are quite
revealing. The ruling gives states “the right to protect society” (the New York Times); it
“would result  to [Carrie Buck’s]  advantage,” by allowing her to be released from the
Colony (the Richmond (VA) Times-Dispatch); Holmes’s “classic” ruling is in accord “with the
most progressive tendencies in our social machine” (the Charlottesville (VA) Daily Progress);
the  decision provides  “the  remedy for  imbecility”  (the  Gastonia  (NC)  Daily  Gazette);  it
“protect[s] the world against morons” (the Davenport (IA) Democrat and Leader); it teaches
us that we don’t “dispose of enough human weeds” (the Helena (MT) Daily Independent); it
should “convince open-minded folk that such legislation is wise” (the Montgomery (AL)
Advertizer); it “opens future possibilities of vast importance in the field of eugenics and
public health” (the Journal of the American Medical Association); it would “halt the imbecile’s
perilous line” (the Literary Digest).140
61 Some reaction was more critical: the Daily Herald, for example, cautioned that eugenic
sterilization was “not a panacea,” and the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin worried that such
programs  might  go  to  extremes.  But,  though  “sentimentalists  were  vexed,”  Time 
magazine reported, “eugenicists cheered” the ruling.141 Eugenicists cheered, all right –
one might  say they gloated.  Among them was Western State Asylum Superintendent
Joseph DeJarnette, a long-time advocate of eugenic sterilization142 and an expert witness
at the first Buck trial.143 The Virginia law, DeJarnette wrote in the Virginia Medical Monthly
for  January  1931,  would  “prevent  a  great  deal  of  unhappiness,  murders,  crimes,
drunkenness and accidents,” and make the state “safer, saner, and better to live in”; and
wraps up his argument with some dreadful doggerel on the subject of “Mendel’s Law”:
Oh, why are you men so foolish –
You breeders who breed our men
Let the fools, the weaklings and crazy
Keep breeding and breeding again? The criminal, deformed, and the misfit,
Dependent, diseased, and the rest –
As we breed the human family The worst
is as good as the best144
62 ... and so on and on, for four more verses.
63 Not surprisingly, after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Buck other states also passed eu-
genics laws: Idaho, Utah, Minnesota, and Maine in 1925; Mississippi in 1928; West Virginia
in 1929; Arizona in 1929; Vermont and Oklahoma in 1931; South Carolina in 1935; and
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Georgia in 1937.145 Not surprisingly, either, legal challenges to such laws continued: for
example, in 1933 the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that, because the state’s 1931
sterilization statute made no provision for notice and a hearing,  it  violated the “due
process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution;146 in 1935 the Supreme
Court  of  Alabama  advised  the  Governor  that  a  sterilization  bill  passed  by  the  state
legislature was unconstitutional for the same reason;147 and in 1942 a 1921 Washington
law was also found to violate due process.148
64 The same year, 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court returned to the subject of eugenics laws for
the first time since Buck.  Skinner v. Oklahoma was a test of the constitutionality of the
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act passed by the Oklahoma legislature in 1935, which
provided  that  a  person  convicted  twice  or  more  of  crimes  “amounting  to  felonies
involving moral turpitude” (in Oklahoma or any other state), and then convicted of a
third such crime in Oklahoma, “shall be rendered sexually sterile.”149 Jack Skinner had
been convicted in 1926 of stealing chickens, and in 1929 and again in 1934 of robbery with
firearms. When the Act passed, he was an inmate in the Oklahoma state penitentiary; and
the state Attorney General instituted proceedings to have him vasectomized.150
65 Skinner argued that this violated his fourteenth amendment rights; and this time the
Supreme Court agreed. By 1942,  the standard of review of lower courts’  decisions on
equal-protection claims was significantly more stringent than it had been in 1927, now
requiring “strict scrutiny.”151 This case, the Court argued, was distinguishable from Buck:
the  Oklahoma  law  clearly  violates  the  “equal  protection”  clause,  since  it  mandates
sterilizing someone convicted three times of larceny but not someone convicted three
times of embezzlement – even though the nature of these crimes is the same, and they
are (in other respects) punishable in the same manner.152
66 Moreover, Justice Douglas continues:
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic rights of man.
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.  The  power  to  sterilize,  if  exercised,  may  have  subtle,  far  reaching  and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.153
67 What is most striking about this passage – besides the way it begins by announcing the
existence of a “basic human right,” and then proceeds to interpret the Constitution so as
plant the seed of a corresponding legal right – is that it suggests that public sentiment on
the subject of eugenics had begun to shift, perhaps because the racial horrors of the Nazi
regime had been known in the U.S. since 1935.154 These dicta aside, however, Skinner still
falls into the old legal pattern, invalidating the Oklahoma law on familiar constitutional
grounds.
68 In 1953 J. E. Coogan argued that it was time for the Supreme Court to overturn Buck;155 but
this has never happened. In 1960, noting how easily they could be abused, the American
Medical Association questioned the wisdom of eugenics laws;156 but in 1962 a study by the
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council found “no medical or other scientific data” to show
that the 1924 statute needed revision.157 And for many years after Skinner courts ruled
other states’ compulsory-sterilization statutes constitutional. In 1968, for example, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska – arguing that while the right to procreate is “a natural and
constitutional  right,” nonetheless “no citizen has any rights that  are superior to the
common  welfare”  –  ruled  in  Cavitt  that  the  state’s  compulsory-sterilization  law was
constitutionally valid.158
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69 By the time of Cavitt, however, it seems that mainstream scientific opinion had shifted
significantly. In 1965, an article in the journal of the American Bar Association observed
that “today’s authorities doubt” the supposed scientific basis for sterilization laws;159 and
Justice Smith’s dissenting opinion in Cavitt cited a then-recent statement by the South
Dakota Medical Association (itself citing numerous articles and textbooks) to the effect
that, with rare exceptions, it was by no means established that heredity is a factor in the
development of mental disease.160 The following year, a law review article pointed out
that, because the number of people actually affected by a genetic defect is always small
relative to the number of carriers, sterilizing only those in whom the gene is expressed
would do little to wipe out the defect.161 Nor, I should add, are the children of a mentally
impaired parent always or inevitably similarly impaired.
70 The legal  landscape  had also  begun to  change  in  relevant  ways  through a  series  of
decisions in which the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evolved
specifically in application to questions of marriage and reproduction. In Loving (1967) the
Court struck down a Virginia statute making interracial marriage a crime, arguing that
this violated “the central meaning of the Equal Protection clause.”162 In Eisenstadt v. Baird
(1972) the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that permitted married but not
single people to obtain contraceptives, recognizing “the right of an individual to be free
of unwarranted government intrusion into matters […] [such] as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.”163 And in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 ruling on
abortion, the Court held that “the right of personal privacy” allowed abortions in the first
trimester of pregnancy, though it added that this right “is not unqualified, and must be
considered against important state interests in legislation,” so that “regulation limiting
certain fundamental rights” may be justified by ‘a compelling state interest’.”164
71 Between  1973  and  1983  ten  states  repealed  their  compulsory-sterilization  laws165 –
including Virginia, which in 1975 finally repealed the statute challenged in Buck. A couple
of years later, in New York – where in 1919 a 1912 law authorizing sterilization of persons
in institutions had been held unconstitutional under the equal protection clause – the
Surrogates  Court  of  Nassau  County  denied  an  application  by  the  parents  of  D.D.  (a
severely  retarded  but  physically  well-developed  16-year-old)  to  have  their  daughter
sterilized, arguing that to allow it would violate her fundamental right to bear children.166
Other states, however, continued to uphold compulsory-sterilization statutes – notably,
in 1977, North Carolina.167 Since Buck,  the state Supreme Court argues in Moore,  many
states had passed sterilization laws; and most had been found constitutional if “notice
and a hearing are provided, if [the law] applied equally to all persons, and if [sterilization]
is not prescribed as a punishment for a crime.”168 The “fundamental right” articulated in
Roe v. Wade was not unlimited, the ruling continues, and “the interest of the unborn child
is sufficient to warrant sterilization in certain instances.”169
72 This legal saga is so fascinating that it’s tempting to keep going, and continue the story to
the present day. But that would take a book; and anyway, it’s high time I returned to the
questions about Holmes’s legal philosophy with which I began.
 
IV. Lessons to be Learned
73 In  the  legal  history  briefly  recounted  here  there  is  some  confirmation  of  Holmes’s
observations to the effect that what the law is depends on what judges (at least, I would
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add, what judges at the highest court) say it is. As Justice Driver wrote for the Supreme
Court of Washington in 1942, “[s]ince the United States Supreme Court, in 1927, decided
the case of Buck v. Bell, “it is considered settled that so far as its substantive features are
concerned, a sterilization statute such as we have here is within the police power of a
state.”170 Moreover, the story I have told provides confirmation of Holmes’s observations
about  the  evolution  of  legal  concepts  –  in  this  instance,  of  the  concepts  of  equal
protection and the right to privacy.
74 Of course,  the story also reveals that what Holmes regarded (with good reason) as a
deleterious confusion of legal and moral senses of the word “right” can also be a very
effec- tive rhetorical tool for bringing about legal change.171 As we saw in Skinner, the
argument that a legal provision violates a fundamental moral right can motivate the first
steps towards the creation of a corresponding legal right.
75 In the early decades of the twentieth century, Nils Roll-Hansen reminds us, eugenics was
“a  science-based  movement  to  combat  threatening  degeneration,  […]  initiated  by
idealistic  scientists  […]  and  inspired  by  a  humanistic  Enlightenment  ideal.”172 Legal
rulings, as we saw, reflected this. So Holmes’s ruling in Buck arguably conforms to his
advice, in “The Path of the Law,” that when considering what interpretation of the law
would be for the good of society, judges look to the sciences.
76 Of course, the story recounted here also reveals the danger that the science to which
judges  look may be weak,  over-simplified,  out-of-date  or,  even if  it  is  sound,  poorly
understood by policy makers and lawyers173 – a danger of which Clarence Darrow had
warned in 1926, while Buck was on appeal.174 This is not to suggest that Holmes’s advice
that judges look to the sciences was inherently flawed – it was good advice, up to a point;
but it is to say that judges should exercise considerable caution not to take the reliability
of plausible-sounding but poorly established and perhaps seriously flawed scientific work
too readily for granted.
77 The rise of eugenics laws in the U.S. and elsewhere clearly reflected prevailing moral and
social attitudes, and the way such laws subsequently fell into disrepute clearly reflected
significant changes in moral and social sensibilities; confirming Holmes’s idea that the
evolution of a legal system reflects the moral evolution of the community.  And most
importantly for present purposes, this story also provides confirmation of Holmes’s moral
fallibilism,  his  sense that  what  truly  contributes  to  the greater  good of  society  isn’t
something of which judges (or anyone) can be certain.
78 In the early decades of the last century many legislators and judges, Holmes included,
were  evidently  convinced  that  eugenics  laws  would  prevent  crime  and  degeneracy,
physical, mental, and moral, and so serve “considerations of social advantage” – that they
were, like laws requiring vaccinations or the isolation of patients suffering from certain
communicable diseases, small sacrifices demanded of individuals for the greater good of
society.  But  already  in  1926  Darrow  had  expressed  alarm  at  “the  sureness  of  the
advocates of this new [eugencist] dream […] their ruthlessness in meddling with life […]
their  stern  righteousness,”175 and  warned  of  “the  pain  and  suffering  that  men have
inflicted upon each other by their cocksureness and their meddling.”176 And to us, now –
knowing what do about how catastrophic Nazi race laws, especially, proved to be, and
accustomed  to  thinking  of  a  person’s  right  to  privacy  and  reproductive  freedom as
unassailable  –  the  Supreme  Court’s  ruling  in  Buck  seems  both  politically  naive  and
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morally blind; but to them, then, it  seemed an entirely reasonable sacrifice to ask of
individuals for the welfare of society, a moral step forward.
79 Don’t get me wrong. I’m not saying that Holmes’s ruling in Buck was a morally good one
given what he thought he knew about the heritability of feeble-mindedness; only that –
even though, by my lights, this ruling manifested a real failure of moral imagination and
judgment –  this  failure  was  understandable  given  what  Holmes  and  his  colleagues
thought they knew. Reading Buck, I find myself wishing that Holmes and his colleagues
had even half of Darrow’s, or Chesterton’s, ability to see the potential for abuse in such
laws. But I have learned from Holmes to reflect that others – for example, Chinese friends
accustomed to many years of the “one-child” policy,177 and with a long cultural history of
stress on social cohesion over individual rights178 – might disagree; and to acknowledge
that it’s hard not to feel some sympathy for the parents of children like D.D.179
80 Hence my conclusion:  For all  his Olympian detachment,180 Holmes was only human –
made up, like the rest of us, “of insight and blindness, pettiness and grandeur.” He was
absolutely right to stress that it is a “misfortune” when a judge “reads his conscious or
unconscious sympathy with one side or the other” – or his own moral convictions –
prematurely  into  the  law.  The  fact  that  Holmes  failed  to  practice,  in  Buck,  what  he
preached  in  “The  Path  of  the  Law,”  shouldn’t  blind  us  to  the  importance  of  this
pragmatist theoretical insight.
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Press, 1924), p. 2.
121. The word refers to the operation of tying and cutting the Fallopian tubes.
122. Buck (note 8 above), 205-6.
123. Id., 205.
124. Gould (note 115 above), p. 15-6.
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after the horrors of the Nazi regime were beginning to be known).
155. Id., 241.
156. Id., 243, citing J. E. Coogan, “Eugenic Sterilization Holds Jubilee,” Catholic World, 177, April
1953: 45-50; “State Sterilization Law: Great American Fraud,” Tucson Register, May 1, 1953.
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Re-Evaluation,” Journal of  Family Law,  14, 1975: 280-308, which summarizes a good deal of the
then-recent literature.
162. Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967).
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